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Abstract
The R package nopp enables computing party/candidate ideological positions that
correspond to a Nash equilibrium along a one-dimensional space. It accommodates alter-
native motivations in (each) party strategy while allowing estimation of the uncertainty
around their optimal positions through Monte Carlo or bootstrap procedures.
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1. Introduction
Since Downs’ seminal work, the spatial theory of voting has been extremely useful in deep-
ening our understanding of strategic party interactions. However, at least in a multiparty
context, the expectations in terms of equilibrium that the theory provides, in particular the
high degree of policy convergence (Adams 1999), usually do not fit very well with actual
party behavior. Divergence in ideological positions is in fact the rule in the real world of
party competition while the cases of spatial “leapfrog” among parties are quite rare (Budge,
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001). In this respect, a number of works have
recently aimed at filling the gap between the theoretical predictions and the empirical world of
party systems. Among the others, Schofield and Sened (2006), Merrill III and Adams (2001)
and Adams, Merrill III, and Grofman (2005) have developed models that, by recognizing the
importance of non-policy variables in affecting voters’ behaviors, are able to produce optimal
party strategies that appear much more in line with real-world elections.
Following this logic, the R (R Core Team 2017) package nopp (Curini and Iacus 2017) com-
putes party/candidate ideological positions along a one-dimensional space that correspond to
a Nash equilibrium. It employs a two-step procedure:
1. It uses survey data to estimate individual respondents’ vote choice through an empirical
model.
2. It uses the parameter estimates of such an empirical model to search for an equilibrium
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configuration in party locations. To this end, nopp implements the Merrill and Adams
(MA) iterative algorithm (Merrill III and Adams 2001; Adams et al. 2005).
The main advantages of package nopp are the following:
• It is easy to use as it requires only two lines of commands to run the entire procedure.
• It takes advantage of the flexibility of the mlogit package (Croissant 2012) with respect
to the choice models that can be estimated.
• It accommodates alternative motivations in (each) party strategy.
• It allows estimation of the uncertainty around the optimal position of parties through
two different procedures (bootstrap and Monte Carlo).
• It also incorporates the possibility to produce a graphical representation of the findings.
Package nopp is available from the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN) at https:
//CRAN.R-project.org/package=nopp.
2. The algorithm
A typical voter utility function with both policy and non-policy factors can be expressed as
follows (see Merrill III and Adams 2001; Adams et al. 2005; Calvo and Hellwig 2011):
Uik(sk, a) = −a(xi − sk)2 + βtik + δzi + ik, (1)
where Uik is the utility of voter i to vote for party k. With respect to the policy component in
Uik, xi and sk are the ideal points of elector i and party k’s locations on the underlying policy
dimension, respectively. The parameter a describes the weight, or salience, of the voter’s
proximity preference, and (xi − sk)2 is a quadratic term measuring the ideological proximity
of voter i to party k. With respect to the non-policy component in Uik, tik is a vector that
describes characteristics of party k related to voter i, such as partisanship or the assessments
about the valence endowment of that party, zi is a vector of i’s individual attributes (e.g., sex,
education), and β and δ respectively describe the salience of the previous two vectors in the
voter’s choice. Finally, ik is a stochastic error term. One plausible assumption (among others;
see below) is that the values of ik are generated independently from a type-I extreme-value
distribution; i.e., the assumption that characterizes the conditional logit (CL) model.
The choice model maximizes the random utility function in Equation 1 to estimate the prob-
ability a voter i will select party k (i.e., Pik) in a K-party election:
Pik(s, a) =
exp{Uik(sk, a)}
K∑
j=1
exp{Uij(sj , a)}
, ∀i, k, (2)
where s is the vector representing the ideological locations of all parties. Merrill III and Adams
(2001) show that the random utility model described in Equation 1 and Equation 2 can be
used to search for a Nash equilibrium in party locations, i.e., a combination of strategies can
be used such that each party k cannot increase its vote share by altering its strategy. Starting
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with the estimated model described in Equation 1, the vote share for party k is given by the
expected value as follows:
EVk(s, a) =
∑
i
Pik(s, a). (3)
At a Nash equilibrium, the partial derivative of EVk with respect to sk must be zero for all
k. That is, for all k:
∂
∂sk
EVk(s, a) = 0, (4)
where the expected vote share, EVk is the sum of the probabilities of voting for party k given
all parties’ strategic locations. From this and solving for sk, we can obtain the location at
which party k maximizes its vote share:
s∗k =
∑
i Pik(s, a) (1− Pik(s, a))xi∑
i
Pik(s, a) (1− Pik(s, a)) . (5)
By iteratively solving for each party’s preferred location, MA provide an algorithm1 to find
each party’s equilibrium s∗. In particular, the iterative algorithm updates the spatial location
of each party in response to changes in the location of all other parties, based on the fixed
proximity and nonproximity factors a, β and δ as these parameters result from the empirical
model of Equation 1. Therefore estimating the equilibrium strategy of party k does not
require information about the actual vote choice of the respondents as in Equation 2.
3. An application: The 2006 Italian general election
3.1. First step: The empirical choice model
The data set italy2006 included in the nopp package contains data from the 2006 Italian
General Election survey (source: CSES – Comparative Study of Electoral Systems; http:
//www.cses.org/). In this survey respondents were asked to indicate which party they
voted for in the 2006 election. The data concerns 5 parties: UL (Ulivo), RC (Communist
Refoundation Party), FI (Forza Italia), AN (National Alliance) and UDC (Union of Christian
Democrats).
For application, nopp requires the data frame to be in a long format (i.e., each row is an
alternative) rather than in a wide format (i.e., each row is an observation). The function
set.data() allows easy transformation of a wide format data frame into a long one. In the
case of italy2006, the original dataset presents a wide format.
Once the nopp package has been installed, for example using install.packages("nopp"),
it should be loaded by typing:
R> library("nopp")
The data set italy2006 is loaded into the R workspace as follows:
R> data("italy2006", package = "nopp")
1See Adams et al. (2005, Appendix 4.1) for a proof of the conditions that guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of Nash equilibria for each party k.
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The overview of the data set can be obtained using the head function as follows
R> head(italy2006)
country id vote self prox_FI prox_UL prox_AN prox_UDC
1 Italy2006 1 UL 4 -14.19090 -0.2111659 -18.27562 -3.949044
2 Italy2006 2 UL 4 -14.19090 -0.2111659 -18.27562 -3.949044
3 Italy2006 3 UL 3 -22.72506 -0.2921100 -27.82562 -8.923485
4 Italy2006 4 UL 4 -14.19090 -0.2111659 -18.27562 -3.949044
5 Italy2006 5 UL 2 -33.25922 -2.3730540 -39.37562 -15.897925
6 Italy2006 6 RC 0 -60.32755 -12.5349426 -68.47562 -35.846806
prox_RC partyID_FI partyID_UL partyID_AN partyID_UDC
1 -4.347948551 0 0 0 0
2 -4.347948551 0 1 0 0
3 -1.177601457 0 0 0 0
4 -4.347948551 0 1 0 0
5 -0.007254523 0 1 0 0
6 -3.666560650 0 0 0 0
partyID_RC sex age education gov_perf
1 0 1 4 1 3
2 0 0 6 0 4
3 0 1 3 1 3
4 0 0 5 0 3
5 0 0 6 4 3
6 1 1 5 2 4
which indicates that italy2006 has the following columns: id (respondent identifier), vote
(the party voted), self (self-placement of respondent on a 0 to 10 left-right scale), prox_*
(ideological distance between the respondent and a party placement estimated as −(selfi −
sk)2, where sk is the survey respondents’ mean party k placement used as party k’s actual
position), and partyID_* (partyID_* = 1 if the respondent declares to feel herself close to
that party, 0 otherwise).
To transform the data frame into a long format, we use a modified version of the mlogit.data
function from the mlogit package called set.data. The package mlogit is loaded by nopp at
startup time:
R> colnames(italy2006)
[1] "country" "id" "vote" "self"
[5] "prox_FI" "prox_UL" "prox_AN" "prox_UDC"
[9] "prox_RC" "partyID_FI" "partyID_UL" "partyID_AN"
[13] "partyID_UDC" "partyID_RC" "sex" "age"
[17] "education" "gov_perf"
R> election <- set.data(italy2006, shape = "wide", choice = "vote",
+ varying = 5:14, sep = "_")
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The compulsory arguments are choice, which is the variable that indicates the choice made
(in our case the variable "vote"), the shape of the original data.frame (in our case: "wide")
and, if there are alternative specific variables (in our case: prox_* and partyID_*), the
varying argument has to be specified as a numeric vector that indicates which columns
contain alternative specific variables. This argument is then passed to reshape the original
data.frame into long format. Further arguments may be passed to control reshaping. For
example, if the names of the variables are of the form var_alt (as in our case), one should
add sep = "_". We can now look at the transformed data set
R> head(election)
country id vote self sex age education gov_perf alt
1.AN Italy2006 1 FALSE 4 1 4 1 3 AN
1.FI Italy2006 1 FALSE 4 1 4 1 3 FI
1.RC Italy2006 1 FALSE 4 1 4 1 3 RC
1.UDC Italy2006 1 FALSE 4 1 4 1 3 UDC
1.UL Italy2006 1 TRUE 4 1 4 1 3 UL
2.AN Italy2006 2 FALSE 4 0 6 0 4 AN
prox partyID chid
1.AN -18.2756214 0 1
1.FI -14.1908979 0 1
1.RC -4.3479486 0 1
1.UDC -3.9490445 0 1
1.UL -0.2111659 0 1
2.AN -18.2756214 0 2
The result is a data.frame in long format with one line for each alternative. The choice
variable is now a logical variable and the individual specific variables (sex, age, education
and gov_perf) are repeated five times. An index attribute is added to the data, which
contains the two relevant indexes: chid, the choice index, and the alt index.
The first step of the analysis consists in the estimation of Equation 1. Let us assume as
an illustrative example that the choice of voter i can be represented as a function of two
properties connecting voter i to party k (her ideological proximity to party k (prox) and her
partyID) and four individual characteristics: sex (equals to 1 for female), age (1 = “18–24
years”, 2 = “25–34”, 3 = “35–44”, 4 = “45–54”, 5 = “55–64”, 6 = “65+”), education (0 =
“up to primary school”, 1 = “incomplete secondary”, 2 = “secondary completed”, 3 = “post-
secondary trade”, 4 = “university undergraduate degree inc”, 5 = “university undergraduate
degree comp”) and voter’s judgment of the incumbent government performance: gov_perf
(1 = “very good job”, 2 = “good job”, 3 = “bad job”, 4 = “very bad job”). We also add
an intercept for each party to capture all the other unmeasured non-policy sources of voters’
party evaluations, including voters’ valence-related evaluations of the parties (such as the
judgment related to party leaders’ competence, integrity, or charisma).
To estimate individual respondents’ vote choice package nopp uses functionality provided by
the mlogit package. We run in this first example a conditional logit model (we also select FI
– Forza Italia party – as the reference alternative; this is optional):
R> m <- mlogit(vote ~ prox + partyID | gov_perf + sex + age + education,
+ election, reflevel = "FI")
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R> summary(m)
Call:
mlogit(formula = vote ~ prox + partyID | gov_perf + sex + age +
education, data = election, reflevel = "FI", method = "nr",
print.level = 0)
Frequencies of alternatives:
FI AN RC UDC UL
0.242009 0.178082 0.100457 0.077626 0.401826
nr method
7 iterations, 0h:0m:0s
g'(-H)^-1g = 0.000248
successive function values within tolerance limits
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AN:(intercept) 0.647570 1.262720 0.5128 0.6080651
RC:(intercept) -4.927774 2.222642 -2.2171 0.0266177 *
UDC:(intercept) -0.996713 1.375212 -0.7248 0.4685926
UL:(intercept) -3.668816 1.415796 -2.5913 0.0095602 **
prox 0.080615 0.012912 6.2436 4.276e-10 ***
partyID 4.115841 0.389591 10.5645 < 2.2e-16 ***
AN:gov_perf 0.071072 0.410497 0.1731 0.8625446
RC:gov_perf 1.890192 0.628987 3.0051 0.0026546 **
UDC:gov_perf -0.054156 0.418196 -0.1295 0.8969623
UL:gov_perf 1.415211 0.405426 3.4907 0.0004818 ***
AN:sex -0.621747 0.481125 -1.2923 0.1962613
RC:sex -1.501041 0.783660 -1.9154 0.0554385 .
UDC:sex -0.340194 0.490517 -0.6935 0.4879692
UL:sex -0.260747 0.482777 -0.5401 0.5891295
AN:age -0.196572 0.156697 -1.2545 0.2096702
RC:age -0.243988 0.246333 -0.9905 0.3219400
UDC:age 0.251847 0.161889 1.5557 0.1197853
UL:age 0.139813 0.158847 0.8802 0.3787672
AN:education 0.071070 0.188558 0.3769 0.7062364
RC:education -0.450525 0.314049 -1.4346 0.1514092
UDC:education 0.169480 0.184193 0.9201 0.3575103
UL:education 0.176575 0.182907 0.9654 0.3343541
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Log-Likelihood: -243.73
McFadden R^2: 0.61524
Likelihood ratio test : chisq = 779.45 (p.value = < 2.22e-16)
Journal of Statistical Software 7
As observed, increasing the ideological proximity between voter i and party k increases the
probability to vote for that party. A similar result applies if voter i displays a party iden-
tification for party k. However, as the judgment about the performance of the center-right
incumbent government worsens, so the chance to vote for any of the opposition parties (rel-
ative to FI, the party headed by the incumbent Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi) increases.
Finally, given that the constants are all relative to the score of FI, which is normalized to be
zero, we can see that there are unmeasured sources of voters’ party evaluations that benefit
FI in a statistical significant way while penalizing the opposition parties (UL and RC).
Note that by employing mlogit we can estimate a large variety of choice models. For example,
conditional logit has been criticized in the literature because it imposes the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property on voter choice (meaning that the relative odds of se-
lecting between two parties is independent of the addition or subtraction of other alternatives
from the choice set; see Alvarez and Nagler 1998). Dow and Endersby (2004) show that for
most applications the IIA assumption is not as restrictive as it might appear. The package
mlogit allows, however, running a number of models that relax the above IIA assumptions,
such as the heteroscedastic logit model, the general extreme value model, the nested logit
model and the multinomial probit model.
Alternatively, we could also decide to run a model with party-varying proximity coefficients,
rather than with a single proximity coefficient for all parties. Through this we move from a
model in which only one parameter for the alternative-specific attribute proximity is estimated
– implying that such attribute is valuated identically with regard to all alternatives/parties
– to a more general model in which the single generic coefficient for proximity is divided
into as many alternative-specific coefficients as there are parties to compete in the election
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). This can be obtained by typing:
R> m2 <- mlogit(vote ~ partyID | gov_perf + sex + age + education | prox,
+ election, reflevel = "FI")
R> summary(m2)
Call:
mlogit(formula = vote ~ partyID | gov_perf + sex + age + education |
prox, data = election, reflevel = "FI", method = "nr", print.level = 0)
Frequencies of alternatives:
FI AN RC UDC UL
0.242009 0.178082 0.100457 0.077626 0.401826
nr method
7 iterations, 0h:0m:0s
g'(-H)^-1g = 4.43E-05
successive function values within tolerance limits
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
AN:(intercept) 0.831976 1.267999 0.6561 0.5117384
RC:(intercept) -5.335890 2.139541 -2.4939 0.0126333 *
UDC:(intercept) -0.715348 1.400122 -0.5109 0.6094083
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UL:(intercept) -3.125356 1.487789 -2.1007 0.0356698 *
partyID 4.179460 0.395892 10.5571 < 2.2e-16 ***
AN:gov_perf -0.040633 0.424475 -0.0957 0.9237383
RC:gov_perf 1.758049 0.597427 2.9427 0.0032537 **
UDC:gov_perf -0.097656 0.432567 -0.2258 0.8213886
UL:gov_perf 1.236409 0.423356 2.9205 0.0034948 **
AN:sex -0.663719 0.485018 -1.3684 0.1711738
RC:sex -1.849938 0.788415 -2.3464 0.0189556 *
UDC:sex -0.452395 0.500718 -0.9035 0.3662654
UL:sex -0.392115 0.507260 -0.7730 0.4395188
AN:age -0.215370 0.158295 -1.3606 0.1736538
RC:age -0.188365 0.242111 -0.7780 0.4365613
UDC:age 0.269604 0.165212 1.6319 0.1027080
UL:age 0.142644 0.165471 0.8620 0.3886622
AN:education 0.066177 0.190695 0.3470 0.7285693
RC:education -0.391942 0.309933 -1.2646 0.2060148
UDC:education 0.175535 0.186911 0.9391 0.3476613
UL:education 0.202944 0.190928 1.0629 0.2878115
FI:prox 0.103039 0.033629 3.0640 0.0021839 **
AN:prox 0.061046 0.024028 2.5407 0.0110641 *
RC:prox 0.011895 0.020846 0.5706 0.5682712
UDC:prox 0.158010 0.049688 3.1801 0.0014723 **
UL:prox 0.114600 0.030862 3.7133 0.0002046 ***
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Log-Likelihood: -236.53
McFadden R^2: 0.6266
Likelihood ratio test : chisq = 793.85 (p.value = < 2.22e-16)
As observed, now the salience of voter proximity is higher for Ulivo, FI and the centrist UDC,
while it is not significant for the radical party RC.
Note that we can also directly estimate a model starting from a wide-format data set by
typing
R> m3 <- mlogit(vote ~ prox + partyID | gov_perf + sex + age +
+ education, italy2006, shape = "wide", choice = "vote",
+ varying = 5:14, sep = "_", reflevel = "FI")
All the previous models, regardless of their form, can then be passed to nopp to estimate the
optimal party position configuration.
3.2. Second step: Estimating party optimal positions
Having empirically estimated all parameters of interest related to the individual respondents’
vote choices, now we have to feed them into the MA algorithm. To this aim, we have to use
the equilibrium command in nopp. Starting from the previous estimated model m, this can
be easily performed by typing:
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R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election)
The mandatory arguments are model, which is the mlogit model analysis, and data, which is
the data set (in long format).
R> nash.eq
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.408 4.717 6.465 6.291 2.300
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
nopp returns both the optimal party positions and the vote-shares of parties at that optimal
configuration.
The user can also decide to pass to nopp a list of external party positions (as they arise for
example from mass media or expert surveys; in this case, from Benoit and Laver 2006) as well
as a list of external vote-shares of parties (according to polls or electoral results) and then
compare the equilibrium party configuration with the external one. For example, if we decide
to use as the external party positions the survey respondents’ mean party placements and as
the external vote-shares of parties the vote-shares they obtain in the survey, we would type:
R> external.pos <- list(FI = 7.76, UL = 3.54, RC = 1.91, AN = 8.27,
+ UDC = 5.99)
R> external.votes <- list(FI = 0.25, UL = 0.38, RC = 0.10, AN = 0.18,
+ UDC = 0.07)
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election, pos = external.pos,
+ votes = external.votes)
R> nash.eq
================
External
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
7.76 3.54 8.27 5.99 1.91
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.25 0.38 0.18 0.07 0.10
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================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.408 4.717 6.465 6.291 2.300
Correlation External/Nash: 0.93
Average Absolute Distance: 1.00
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
Correlation External/Nash: 1.00
Average Absolute Distance: 0.67%
The results make clear that there are marked similarities between actual and optimal positions
(average absolute distance from actual party position: 1.00; Pearson-R: .93). Furthermore,
the projected vote-shares of parties found in the Nash equilibrium looks remarkably close to
actual vote-shares (approximately 0.67% of difference on average). This of course does not
imply that all parties are simple-minded vote-maximizers, but still by assuming it we get to
a close proxy to the actual (but unobservable) utility function deployed by party leaders in
the Italian 2006 electoral context.
nopp is also extremely flexible with respect to alternative motivations in party strategy. For
example, two pre-electoral coalitions were competing in the 2006 Italian general election: a
center-left coalition (UL and RC) and a center-right coalition (FI, UDC and AN). In such
circumstance we could expect that party’s utility from the election is not only linked to the
vote-share it would obtain but also, to varying degrees, to the electoral success of its own
coalition. This could affect party strategy on where to locate in the ideological space during
the electoral campaign (Golder 2006).
More formally, the utility that party k belonging to coalition cj attached to an electoral
outcome can be considered as the weighted sum of its expected vote-share (EVk) and the
expected vote of its coalition partners:
Uk = EVk + α
∑
i=cj
EVi, (6)
where i are the parties – other than k – belonging to coalition cj (see Adams et al. 2005,
p. 113). When α = 0, parties are purely vote-seeking (like in the previous scenario), while if
α increases parties start to weight both their own votes and those of their coalition partners.
At the extreme, when α = 1, parties weight their own votes exactly as those of their coalition
partners. An example:
R> coal1 <- list(FI = 1, UL = 2, RC = 2, AN = 1, UDC = 1)
With the above line of command, the parties are assigned to two different coalitions.
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R> alpha1 <- list(FI = 0.7, UL = 0.8, RC = 0.1, AN = 0.5, UDC = 0.5)
With this second line of command, the values of α are defined for each party. Note that α
can be different across coalitions as well as within the same coalition.
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election, coal = coal1,
+ alpha = alpha1)
R> nash.eq
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
5.581 5.422 6.088 5.603 2.349
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.386 0.186 0.074 0.112
Also in this case, we could add to our command a list specifying the external party position
and the external vote-shares of parties.
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ pos = c(FI = 7.76, UL = 3.54, RC = 1.91, AN = 8.27, UDC = 5.99),
+ votes = c(FI = 0.25, UL = 0.38, RC = 0.10, AN = 0.18, UDC = 0.07),
+ coal = coal1, alpha = alpha1)
R> nash.eq
================
External
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
7.76 3.54 8.27 5.99 1.91
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.25 0.38 0.18 0.07 0.10
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
5.581 5.422 6.088 5.603 2.349
12 nopp: Nash Optimal Party Positions in R
Correlation External/Nash: 0.81
Average Absolute Distance: 1.41
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.386 0.186 0.074 0.112
Correlation External/Nash: 1.00
Average Absolute Distance: 0.69%
Compared to the previous scenario in which parties are expected to be just vote-maximizers,
an equilibrium in which parties care also about the votes obtained by their own coalition (as
depicted above) produces equilibria positions that resemble less well the actual positions of
Italian parties during the 2006 election (average absolute distance: 1.00 vs. 1.41)2.
A party k could also be motivated to maximize its margin relative to party j. The probability
that parties act as margin-maximizers rather than vote-maximizers can be due for example
to the type of electoral system employed, e.g., plurality vs. proportional systems (Cox 1990).
Let us assume that UL is interested in maximizing its margin relative to FI. Then, we would
type:
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ margin = list(UL = "FI"))
R> nash.eq
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.372 4.937 6.426 6.222 2.311
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.392 0.183 0.073 0.109
margin is not a symmetric command. Therefore, if both UL and FI are interested maximizing
their vote margins relative to each other, we would write:
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ margin = list(FI = "UL", UL = "FI"))
R> nash.eq
2In this sense, one could also infer that the existence of pre-electoral coalitions seems to have played no
relevant role in the parties’ spatial behaviors during the 2006 Italian electoral stage, given that members of
both blocks appear unfocused on how their policy strategies influence the collective appeal of their coalition
block (for more on this point see Curini and Iacus 2008).
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================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
5.925 4.891 6.495 6.349 2.309
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.242 0.392 0.184 0.074 0.109
Untill now we have imposed no restrictions on party positioning, leaving parties completely
free to manipulate their policy images. This is an option that we can restrict in nopp. That
is, party k can be modeled as being stuck (to a varying degree) to a specific party location
for various reasons, for example, fear of losing reputation among electors, uncertainty about
popular preferences, activists’ concern for established ideology, etc. (Curini and Hino 2105;
Budge 1994; Plümper and Martin 2008). When this happens, in the final Nash configuration
of party positions, the position of party k can be expressed as: fixed · (1 − γ) + nash · γ,
where nash is the optimal party position when that party is free to move and fixed is the
“stuck” party position.
When γ = 1, a party’s policy choices can span with no spatial limits. When γ = 0, a party
is fixed to the spatial position specified by the user. When 0 < γ < 1, the final position of
party k will depend on both considerations (maximizing its vote-shares on one hand and the
concern to protect its ideological reputation on the other). For example, let us fix RC party
at 1.95 and assume that γ is equal to 0.5 for that party. Then, we would type:
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ fixed = list(RC = 1.95), gamma = 0.5)
R> nash.eq
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.409 4.726 6.466 6.291 2.094
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
Notice that through nopp we can also easily combine different party motivations in a variety
of ways. Below we report two hypothetical scenarios:
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Example 1:
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ margin = list(FI = "UL", UL = "FI"),
+ fixed = list(RC = 1), gamma = 0.2)
Example 2:
R> coal1 <- list(FI = 1, UL = 2, RC = 2, AN = 1, UDC = 1)
R> alpha1 <- list(FI = 0.7, UL = 0.8, RC = 0.5, AN = 0.5, UDC = 0.5)
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election, coal = coal1,
+ alpha = alpha1, fixed = list(RC = 1), gamma = 0.6)
3.3. Linear utility function
In Equation 1 we have assumed a quadratic utility function for the voters with respect to the
policy component of Uik. An alternative would be to assume a linear utility function, i.e.,
Uik(sk, a) = −a|xi − sk|+ βtik + δzi + ik. (7)
In the italy2006.lin dataset included in nopp the ideological proximity variable (labelled
proxlin_*) has been computed as −|selfi − sk|. This variable allows the estimation of the
empirical model by employing a linear utility function. From the empirical model, we can do
the same with respect to the computation of the Nash equilibrium in party locations. Once
reshaped in a long format italy2006.lin, we would type two lines of commands to run the
entire procedure:
R> data("italy2006.lin", package = "nopp")
R> election3 <- set.data(italy2006.lin, shape = "wide",
+ choice = "vote", varying = 5:14, sep = "_")
R> m3 <- mlogit(vote ~ proxlin + partyID | gov_perf + sex + age +
+ education, election3, reflevel = "FI")
R> nash.eq3 <- equilibrium(model = m3, data = election3,
+ quadratic = FALSE)
The FALSE option after the quadratic option tells nopp to adopt the MA algorithm for linear
utility
R> nash.eq3
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.913 4.335 7.140 5.978 2.125
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.242 0.402 0.178 0.078 0.100
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3.4. Estimating uncertainty
The nopp package can also estimate the confidence intervals around the optimal party po-
sitions (as well as the party vote-shares at that optimal configuration) in two different (and
mutually excludable) ways:
(1) By means of a bootstrap procedure. The observations are resampled and the Nash equi-
librium is re-evaluated. The bootstrap procedure is as follows:
1. Estimate the statistical model m with coefficient matrix b using the original data, D.
2. Draw D∗ randomly with replacement from the original data D.
3. Re-estimate anew the model m∗ with coefficient matrix b∗ on the new data D∗.
4. Calculate Nash-optimal party placements using b∗ and D∗.
5. Repeat steps 2–4, R times.
(2) By means of a Monte Carlo simulation starting from the empirical estimation. The coeffi-
cients of the model fitted with mlogit are resampled independently from their asymptotic
Gaussian distribution and the Nash equilibrium is re-evaluated each time. Compared
to the former method, this alternative appears as more “Bayesian” in spirit, given that
it takes the estimated coefficients of the model fitted with mlogit as its priors before
simulation. The Monte Carlo method implemented in nopp is as follows:
1. Estimate the statistical model m with coefficient matrix b and variance-covariance
matrix V using the original data, D.
2. Draw new coefficients b∗ from the Gaussian distribution N (b,V).
3. Calculate Nash-optimal party placements using b∗ and the original data D.
4. Repeat steps 2–3, R times.
The above strategies are in line with what is suggested in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).
Note that for each simulation, there is a unique Nash equilibrium that is independent of the
randomly generated starting points used in the algorithm for parties’ initial placements.
To run a bootstrap procedure, we only have to set the boot argument specifying the number
of boostrap replications as follows:
R> set.seed(123)
R> nash.eq.boot <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election, boot = 100)
R> nash.eq.boot
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.408 4.717 6.465 6.291 2.300
Party vote-shares:
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FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
================
Bootstrap
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
2.5% lower bound 5.797 4.013 5.678 4.962 1.416
mean estimate 6.424 4.616 6.415 6.246 2.354
97.5% upper bound 7.040 5.094 7.220 7.386 3.332
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
2.5% lower bound 0.207 0.338 0.154 0.049 0.081
mean estimate 0.243 0.391 0.188 0.070 0.108
97.5% upper bound 0.288 0.442 0.230 0.095 0.139
Bootstrap replications: 100
Similarly, to run a Monte Carlo procedure, we need to add the MC option specifying the
number of replications.
R> set.seed(123)
R> nash.eq.mc <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election, MC = 100)
R> nash.eq.mc
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.408 4.717 6.465 6.291 2.300
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
================
Monte Carlo
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
2.5% lower bound 5.953 4.376 5.783 5.018 1.819
mean estimate 6.419 4.703 6.457 6.237 2.402
97.5% upper bound 6.870 5.086 7.002 6.868 3.034
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Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
2.5% lower bound 0.219 0.359 0.159 0.053 0.095
mean estimate 0.242 0.391 0.185 0.074 0.108
97.5% upper bound 0.271 0.428 0.212 0.097 0.126
The confidence level can be specified by the argument conf.int (by default 0.95) in the
equilibrium function. The complete series of simulated party positions and party shares is
contained in the output object of equilibrium for later user manipulation.
Note that, as the typical standard error of both Monte Carlo and bootstrap experiments are
proportional to 1/
√
R to get at least the first decimal digit right, one should use at least
R = 10000 replications but in our runs above we set R = 100 just as an example of use.
4. Graphical display of the results
Through nopp it is also possible to display graphically the results of the analysis with the
plot command (see Figure 1):
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election)
and passing the output of the function equilibrium to the plot function
R> plot(nash.eq)
In this case, nopp reports parties’ equilibrium positions (upper panel of Figure 1), while in
the lower panel of Figure 1 the height of each line centered on each party’s optimal position is
proportional to the amount of votes that each party gets in the equilibrium. Had we passed to
nopp a list of external party positions and external vote-shares of parties, we could also display
the optimal party positions/party vote-shares against the external party positions/party vote-
shares.
We first create two list objects containing the quantities of interest.
R> external.pos <- list(FI = 7.76, UL = 3.54, RC = 1.91, AN = 8.27,
+ UDC = 5.99)
R> external.votes <- list(FI = 0.25, UL = 0.38, RC = 0.10, AN = 0.18,
+ UDC = 0.07)
and then pass these lists of votes and external positions as arguments to the equilibrium
function
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election,
+ pos = external.pos, votes = external.votes)
and then plot the estimates via
R> plot(nash.eq)
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Figure 1: Plot of Nash equilibrium party positions alone (up) with the corresponding party
vote-shares (down).
The results are shown in Figure 2. Alternatively, to obtain the same graphs we could type:
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election)
R> plot(nash.eq, pos = list(FI = 7.76, UL = 3.54, RC = 1.91, AN = 8.27,
+ UDC = 5.99))
R> plot(nash.eq, votes = list(FI = 0.25, UL = 0.38, RC = 0.10, AN = 0.18,
+ UDC = 0.07))
After running a bootstrap procedure, the plot command also displays parties’ equilibrium
positions with their corresponding confidence intervals, as well as a graph contrasting the
equilibrium positions as they arise from the normal Nash procedure and from the bootstrap
Nash procedure (see Figure 3), with
R> plot(nash.eq.boot)
The same happens after running a Monte Carlo procedure.
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Figure 3: Plot of Nash equilibrium party positions (up) and vote-shares (down) with 95%
bootstrap confidence intervals.
5. Conclusions
Comparing real data with a clear counterfactual scenario is always useful to derive (possibly
new) insights on the phenomenon that we want to understand. This type of proto-theoretical
exercise (Axelrod 1997) is what nopp allows the researcher to do. In this respect, we consider
the flexibility of nopp’s in relation to the different motivations in each party’s strategies it
can accommodate (partly or fully vote seeking, party or fully coalition seeking, etc.) and the
estimation procedures it can include (linear or quadratic utility functions, conditional logit
or models that relax the IIA assumption, different estimation of uncertainty, etc.) as useful
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tools for scholars interested in modeling party competition within a spatial framework. By
estimating parties’ equilibrium policy positions, it becomes possible, for example, to contrast
the actual positions of the parties with a theoretical benchmark. The aim of such comparison
is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties under different scenarios
and to derive intuitions on real party system competition based on this understanding (see
for example Curini 2015; Guarnieri 2014; Mauerer, Thurner, and Debus 2015).
Future alternative specifications for Uik that may be used in place of the utility model de-
fined in Equation 1 includes a post-electoral policy preference model (Kedar 2005), a policy
discounting model (Adams et al. 2005), a model that mixes directional and proximity theory
(Merrill III and Grofman 1999), a model in which the utility attached to voting for a party is
affected by expectations of the transmission of votes into representation in government (Calvo
and Hellwig 2011), and others.
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A. Preparing the data
In this appendix we briefly explain how to build a dataset in R that can be used in nopp
starting from a format displayed by the majority of electoral survey data available online.
The dataset that we will use is called italy2006.wide (source: http://www.cses.org/).
R> data("italy2006.wide", package = "nopp")
R> head(italy2006.wide)
country id self FI DS AN DL UDC RC pID age sex education vote gov_perf
1 Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1 UL NA
2 Italy2006 2 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 4 1 1 UL 3
3 Italy2006 3 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 23 6 0 0 UL 4
4 Italy2006 4 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 3 1 1 UL 3
5 Italy2006 5 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 23 5 0 0 UL 3
6 Italy2006 6 10 1 9 9 7 6 1 3 4 1 4 AN NA
where vote is a variable that identifies the party voted for by the respondent in the 2006
Italian general election, self is the self-placement of respondent on a 0 to 10 left-right scale,
pID is a variable that identifies the partisanship of the respondent (where 0 = stands for no
party ID, 1 = FI party ID, 23 = UL party ID, 3 = AN party ID, 4 = UDC party ID, 6 = RC
party ID), and the variables from FI to RC identify the placement of those parties as perceived
by the respondent.
As the first step, we estimate the survey respondents’ mean in each party placement used as
the party’s actual position.
R> varlist <- c("FI", "DS", "AN", "DL", "UDC", "RC")
R> for (var in varlist) {
+ assign(sprintf("mean_%s", var),
+ mean(italy2006.wide[, var], na.rm = TRUE))
+ }
Note that in the 2006 Italian general election the two main parties of the center-left coalition
(DS and DL) presented a joint list for the Chamber of Deputies (under the name of “Ulivo
– UL”). Therefore, in our analysis to estimate the placement of UL we compute the average
between DS and DL.
R> mean_UL <- (mean_DS + mean_DL) / 2
R> mean_UL
[1] 3.540472
To compute the ideological distance between the respondent and each party placement ac-
cording to a quadratic utility function (i.e., −(selfi − sk)2), we would type:
R> varlist <- c("FI", "UL", "AN", "UDC", "RC")
R> for (var in varlist) {
+ italy2006.wide[[sprintf("prox_%s", var)]] <-
+ - (get(sprintf("mean_%s", var)) - italy2006.wide$self)^2
+ }
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On the other hand, to compute the same ideological distance but according to a linear utility
function (i.e., −|selfi − sk|.), we would type:
R> for (var in varlist) {
+ italy2006.wide[[sprintf("proxlin_%s", var)]] <-
+ - abs(get(sprintf("mean_%s", var)) - italy2006.wide$self)
+ }
R> head(italy2006.wide)
country id self FI DS AN DL UDC RC pID age sex education vote
1 Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1 UL
2 Italy2006 2 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 4 1 1 UL
3 Italy2006 3 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 23 6 0 0 UL
4 Italy2006 4 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 3 1 1 UL
5 Italy2006 5 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 23 5 0 0 UL
6 Italy2006 6 10 1 9 9 7 6 1 3 4 1 4 AN
gov_perf prox_FI prox_UL prox_AN prox_UDC prox_RC
1 NA -22.725059 -0.292110 -27.825625 -8.923486 -1.177602
2 3 -14.190897 -0.211166 -18.275625 -3.949045 -4.347949
3 4 -14.190897 -0.211166 -18.275625 -3.949045 -4.347949
4 3 -22.725059 -0.292110 -27.825625 -8.923486 -1.177602
5 3 -14.190897 -0.211166 -18.275625 -3.949045 -4.347949
6 NA -4.985928 -41.725502 -2.975625 -16.102400 -65.370031
proxlin_FI proxlin_UL proxlin_AN proxlin_UDC proxlin_RC
1 -4.767081 -0.540472 -5.275 -2.98722 -1.085174
2 -3.767081 -0.459528 -4.275 -1.98722 -2.085174
3 -3.767081 -0.459528 -4.275 -1.98722 -2.085174
4 -4.767081 -0.540472 -5.275 -2.98722 -1.085174
5 -3.767081 -0.459528 -4.275 -1.98722 -2.085174
6 -2.232919 -6.459528 -1.725 -4.01278 -8.085174
Eventually, we could compute the quadratic proximity between self and the placement of
each party as perceived by the same respondent, by typing:
R> italy2006.wide$UL <- (italy2006.wide$DS + italy2006.wide$DL) / 2
R> varlist <- c("FI", "UL", "AN", "UDC", "RC")
R> for (var in varlist) {
+ italy2006.wide[[sprintf("proxego_%s", var)]] <-
+ - (italy2006.wide[[var]] - italy2006.wide$self)^2
+ }
Finally, we could want to compute a partisanship variable for each party that takes the value
of 1 if a respondent is identified with a specific party. In this particular data set, the ID that
identifies each party is a numerical value, so the following procedure is needed to create the
partyID variables
R> italy2006.wide$partyID_FI <- as.numeric(italy2006.wide$pID == 1)
R> italy2006.wide$partyID_UL <- as.numeric(italy2006.wide$pID == 23)
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R> italy2006.wide$partyID_AN <- as.numeric(italy2006.wide$pID == 3)
R> italy2006.wide$partyID_UDC <- as.numeric(italy2006.wide$pID == 4)
R> italy2006.wide$partyID_RC <- as.numeric(italy2006.wide$pID == 6)
Now the dataset is ready to be used in nopp
R> colnames(italy2006.wide)
[1] "country" "id" "self" "FI"
[5] "DS" "AN" "DL" "UDC"
[9] "RC" "pID" "age" "sex"
[13] "education" "vote" "gov_perf" "prox_FI"
[17] "prox_UL" "prox_AN" "prox_UDC" "prox_RC"
[21] "proxlin_FI" "proxlin_UL" "proxlin_AN" "proxlin_UDC"
[25] "proxlin_RC" "UL" "proxego_FI" "proxego_UL"
[29] "proxego_AN" "proxego_UDC" "proxego_RC" "partyID_FI"
[33] "partyID_UL" "partyID_AN" "partyID_UDC" "partyID_RC"
R> election <- set.data(italy2006.wide, shape = "wide",
+ choice = "vote", varying = c(16:25, 27:36), sep = "_")
R> head(election)
country id self FI DS AN DL UDC RC pID age sex education
1.AN Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1
1.FI Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1
1.RC Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1
1.UDC Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1
1.UL Italy2006 1 3 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 0 1
2.AN Italy2006 2 4 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 4 1 1
vote gov_perf UL alt prox proxlin proxego partyID chid
1.AN FALSE NA NA AN -27.825625 -5.275000 NA 0 1
1.FI FALSE NA NA FI -22.725059 -4.767081 NA 0 1
1.RC FALSE NA NA RC -1.177602 -1.085174 NA 0 1
1.UDC FALSE NA NA UDC -8.923486 -2.987220 NA 0 1
1.UL TRUE NA NA UL -0.292110 -0.540472 NA 0 1
2.AN FALSE 3 NA AN -18.275625 -4.275000 NA 0 2
Note that in the election object there are also several missing values. This does not con-
stitute a problem for the estimation of the empirical model. However, the missing values,
where present, should be dropped from the dataset before calling the equilibrium routine, in
the following way:
R> m <- mlogit(vote ~ prox + partyID | gov_perf + sex, election,
+ reflevel = "UL")
R> election2 <- election
R> idx <- which(is.na(election2$gov_perf) | is.na(election2$prox) |
+ is.na(election2$partyID))
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R> election2 <- election2[-idx, ]
R> nash.eq <- equilibrium(model = m, data = election2)
R> nash.eq
================
Nash equilibrium
================
Party positions:
FI UL AN UDC RC
6.420 4.763 6.378 6.456 2.295
Party vote-shares:
FI UL AN UDC RC
0.243 0.393 0.183 0.073 0.108
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